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III The Pollhcs of Expansion 
The Game of the Third Mobilization 
The prev10us section has dealt with the game of the second mobilization, 
which resulted in the oficial statement of July 20, and the decision to send 
three home d1vtS10ns to North China 
Durmg the period of July 21 to 29, the decision of the second mobilization 
was cancelled and hereby another round of the mobilization game stil had to 
be played, which resulted in a final decision to dispatch the troops. 
July 21ー Inprotest against the Foreign Minister’s unsuccessful 
opposition to the mobilization proposal on the previous day despite Ishii’s 
request, Ishii and Kamimura tried to submit thetr reSl呂natl。nt。the
Mm 
Returning to Tokyo from an mspεction t。urt。NorthChma, Colonel 
Shibayarr】aand Maior General Na』《aj1mapresented in the afternoon a report 
that there was no need to dispatch troops from Japan since the local 
agreement was bemg implemented by the Chinese '2 Colonel Shibayama had 
had thtS information sent from Dairen on July 15. So 1t was supposed to have 
reached the central dectSion-makers much earlier, but an ofi口alin charge of 
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receiving the telegrams had kept 1t unreported Then came a tele旦ramfrom 
Ma1or General Hashimoto of the North Chma Army, stating that a dispatch 
of troops was neither necessary nor desired.附 Thusthe information 
encoura呂edthose who hoped for the localization of the incident and helped 
Major General Ishiwara cancel the mobilization order again'" 
In the afternoon, British Charge d’Affairs Dodds told Vice Foreign 
Minister Horiuchi that Chiang K副shekstil hoped for negotiat10ns to reach 
a peaceful settlement: 
In Nanking Chiang Kai-shek's military committee received at m且htSung 
Cheh-yuan’s telegram about the local agreement "' 
Contrary to the favorable development for the peaceful settlement, the 
Communist elements were maneuverin呂田 provokeboth the Japanese and 
Chinese field armise to fi且hteach other by setting of fire crackers at mght 
between them刷 Inaddition, Sung Cheh yuan had ordered the 37th Division 
at Papaoshan to withdraw, but the Division did not receive the order 剛 The
Special Service Agency of the North Chma Army detected such information 
stated above, which was probably not available to the decision-makers in 
Tokyo at that time. 
- July 22 The Army General Staff could not form a consensus on 
mobilization Colonel Muto stil persisted m mobilization and defied Major 
General Ishiwara, saying，“Either you or I ought to resi且n1""' At 1:00 
p.m. the Army General Staff decided that mobilization would be postponed 
for the time being unless the Cabinet was determined to settle the North 
" China problem completely.
General Hsmng Ping, Vice Chief of the Chinese Central Army, arrived in 
Peiping to inform Sung Cheh-yuan of Chiang Kai-shek司sinstruction." 
Chiang Kai-shek reportedly gave tacit approval to local settlement and at the 
same time ordered to continue necessary reinforcements."' General Hsiung 
Ping’s visit to P剖ping,however, seemed only to encourage such hardliners 
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as Chin Teh chun and Feng Chih an to take a firmer attitude. The 
General、itwas said, took away Chin Teh chun’S wife as hosta呂e."'
July 23ー lnthe morning, Ishi, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau, 
Colonel Shibayama, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, and Rear Adm. 
Toyoda, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau agreed to a general principle of the 
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negotiations Parucularly, Ishi held an optimistic view that the local 
'" settlement would soon be probable In the meantime, Lt-Col. Wachi of the 
North Chma Army, who had arrived on the previous day, reported 旬、/Var
Minister Sugiyama as folows・ 
Everyone in the Stationary Army, from the Commanding Officer to 
the soldier, sticks to non expansion. Thus the 29th Army m Pinchm 
thmk they have won This makes our officers and men on the front 
furious, accusing the Central Headquarters of its soft stance. The 
Central Army of the Nanking Government has entered the province of 
Hopei and broken the Umezu Ho Agreement. Do not mdefinitely 
stick to non expansion. Now isthe time to change the situation"' 
The War Minister replied that‘＇ . non-expansion of the m口dentmeans to 
avoid a total war, but not to endure the los of pr田 tigeof our Imperial 
Army H 仰 Lt-ColWachi was one of the hardliners m the North China 
Army, and those who wanted to prevent him from meddling with the 
日’negotiations had called him back. Contrary to th目rintention, Lt-Col. 
Wachi worked on the War Minister and others as well " 
- July 24ー InPeiping, the 3 7th Division of the Chinese Army, which 
had started withdrawing on July 22, began reinforcing instead of 
withdrawing.'" To cope with this situation, the Commander of the North 
China Army ordered the chief of the Special Service Agency to have Sung 
Cheh yuan implement the withdrawal." But it seemed that Sung 
Cheh yuan lost control of his army by that time and that Chin Teh chun and 
Feng Chih-an were dominant.阻
Kao Tsung wu, the head of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign 
Mmistry, met with Japanese Counsellor Hidaka Kao informed him of the 
meetmg with Chiang Kai-shek, and of the intention of the Nationalist 
Government to acq山田町inlocal settlement.凶
- July 25 -Japanese Counsellor Hidaka met with General Chang Chun, 
the Governor of Szechuan, a friend and confidant of Chiang Kai-shek The 
general, contacting Chiang Kai shek during the talk, consented to the July 
11th agreement They agreed to the withdrawal of both armies accordmg to 
the agreement The Councellor thought that the settlement of the incident 
" would be probable But Chiang Ka1-shek anticipated that before long the 
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Japanese Government would present unacceptable demands to the Chinese 
Government, and "war would therefore be inevi回ble.＇’ Hesaid to the U S. 
Ambassador to China to the efect that“the concentration of forces and 
supplies m Korea and Manchuna m addition to what (had) already been put 
into Tientsin”made him believe that "Japan (was) preparing to force China 
to accept new demands far beyond the present local settlement of the Marca 
Polo Bridge afair ”日 Furthermore, according to Wang Chung-hui, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, "the Chinese Government was convinced that 
the Japanese Government must stil have a major objective and had accepted 
the present truce merely as a means of bringing about a lul during which 
preparations might be made for the attainment of the major objective in 
North China "" 
In the m回ntime,Major General Kazuki, Commander of the North China 
Army notified Chang Tzu Chung that, to repair telephone Imes, a small 
detachment together with one company of the troops to protect it would be 
sent to Langfang on the P目ping-T1entsmRailway. The Army’s telephone 
lines were frequently disrupted by the Chinese." Although Chang Tzu 
Chung, who was regarded as pro-Japanese, showed apprehension that trouble 
might occur between his d1vis1on at Langfang and the Japanese soldiers, he 
accepted the notice, asking the Commander to send, if possible, a minimum 
number of soldiers闘 Thecompany, which arrived at Langfang station at 
about 4: 30 p.m., was suddenly attacked at about 11・10p m by Chang Tzu 
Chung’s 38th Division " Whatever the reason for this attack, it seemed to 
have shocked the North Chma Army and Central Headquarters because 
Chung Tzu Chung was pro-Japanese and his division had never got into 
'" trouble with the Japanese army. To rescue the company two battalions 
were sent from Tien回in."'
July 26 At about 1 :00 a.m. Major General Kazuki ordered Major 
Hirobe's battalion to go to Pe1pmg to protect the Japanese nationals there.国
At 8: 00 a.m. the Special Service Agency decided that the notice of the 
dispatch of the battalion would be delivered to the Chinese about haU an hour 
before its arrival For the Agency thought that, if they were informed well in 
advance, the Chinese might refuse the battalion to enter the city because of 
the Langfang incident.凶 At11: 30 am. the Commander sent to Colonel 
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Matsui, Chief of the Special Service Agency, a telegram concerning the 
demands to be delivered to General Sung Cheh yuan. At the same time he 
informed the Central Headquarters of the incident, requestmg permission to 
use force.~＇ Then, the Commander received a telegraphic order from Major 
General lshiwara, which said, . Chastise them completely. The General Staff 
wil assume al the responsibilities includmg the address to the Throne."" 
At 2 30 p.m. the Commander ordered Colonel Matsui, by telegram, to 
deliver to General Sung Cheh-yuan the above stated demands," which were 
as follows: 
1 The troops of the 37th Division in the Papaoshan and Marco Polo 
Bridge area must withdraw by noon of July 27 to Changhsmuen 
area, 
2 the troops of the 37th D1viS1on m Peiping and at Hsiyuan must 
withdraw by noon of July 28 to west of the Yungtmg River; 
3. if you fail to implement these terms, the Japanese army will doubt 
your sincerity and will have to take a unilateral action舗
At 3: 30 pm Colonel Matsui and Lt-Col. Teradaira visited General Sung 
Cheh-yuan, but he failed to appear, pretending to be il General Chm 
Teh chun, Mayor of Peiping, who met the colonel, reluctantly promised, 
after two hours of negotiations, to hand the letter to General Sung 
Cheh yuan ~＇ 
The notice that the battalion was to arnve at Kuanganmen at 4.00 pm. 
was delivered to the Chinese officers there at about 3: 50 p.m. with 
unexpected delay." The battalion, which was delayed with preparation, 
arrived at Kuanganmen at about 3う0p.m Then the且ate,which had been 
opened moments before by Japanese request, was closed and the Chinese 
soldiers were prepared to fight Major Sakurai had it opened again. Then, an 
unidentified young Chmese, who was whISpering with someone on the 
phone, said, ＇‘there’s a cal from Mayor Chin Teh-chun, I suppose’川 It
was an order from Chin Teh chun to close the gate仰 ThenMajor Sakurai 
managed to phone Lt Col. Teradaira, who was stil with Chin Teh-chun after 
the negotiation. Teradaira persistently requested Chin Teh chun to open the 
且ate,saying that it was the only way to avoid a clash between the two 
armies.仙 ThusGeneral Chin Teh chun ordered the gate to be opened. 
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At7・0〔Jp m. the gate was finally opened and the bat阻honbegan to enter 
the city However, soon after the first two trucks passed through the gate, 
they were fired at by nfles and machine guns.刷
At 10・20p.m. the Commander of the North China Army, presuming that 
H!fobe’s battalion had been destroyed, issued an order to the Army to launch 
川島
an attack at noon of July 27 But the time for the attack had to be changed 
because the ultimata delivered to the Chinese had already set the deadline for 
noon of July 28, and also because the Japanese nationals in Peiping would 
need some time to evacuate." The Kuanganmen incident, it seemed, made 
the Commander of the North China Army decide to discard the 
ー“nnon-expansion policy 
- July 27 - At 1・00a m. after bemg informed of the incident, Major 
General lsh1wara, Chief of the Operations Division, phoned Colonel Tanaka, 
Chief of the Army Affalfs Sect1on, and said anxiously that“There’s no way 
but to mobilize home d1v1Sions Any delay would cause a total disaster. Do it
right away." Colonel Tanaka regarded blitzkneg as the only way to locally 
settle the issue, and so did the War and Vice War Minis目印刷 TheChief of 
the Army General Staff and the War Minister decided on dispatching home 
divisions and on conferrmg a new duty on the Commander of the North 
China Army to cope with the situation.附
At8・40am an emergency Cabinet session was held. Naval Mm1Ster Yonai 
suggested to War Minister Sugiyama that it should be considered to send land 
troops to Shanghai and Tsmgtao for the future. As the Cabinet Ministers, 
with the exception of both Service Ministers, were not at al informed of the 
range of the military operauons, Prime Minister Konoye had Overseas 
Affalfs Mimster Otam ask the War Mimster about it The Naval Mimster 
replied in place of the War Mmister who kept sil四 t，“Thetroops will 
advance to the Yungtmg River.” The War Mi即日erwas annoyed and 
shouted, "You shouldn’t talk about matters concernmg the Supreme 
" Command " Although the Prime Minister was unsatisfied with the War 
Minister’s atlltude, he did not seem to press the matter any further here."' 
The Cabmet agreed that mobilization would stabilize the Pmgchm area, stil 
" maintaining the non expansion policy. The Chief Secretary of the Cabinet 
delivered the followmg statement. 
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Both the Langfang and Kuanganrnen incidents were the Chinese 
Army’s military interferences with our Stattonary Army’s duties to 
secure出ePe1ping-Tientsin communications and to protect our 
nationals. Now the Army has been forced to take self defense actions 
necessary to pursue these duttes and to ensure implementation of the 
terms of the agreement . The Imperial Government has no territorial 
designs. The Imperial Government .stil sincerely hopes that the 
reflections on the part of the Chinese will min：皿izethe incident, and 
hereby an early settlement will be brought about " 
In the meantime, at 11 :30 am. General Sung Cheh-yuan notified that al 
of the demands by the Japanese would be carried out. But he seemed to have 
already been ordered by Chiang Kai shek to resist the Japanese.• 
- July 28 At 2.00 a.m. Colonel Matsui delivered to General Sung 
Cheh-yuan the notice of Commander Kazuki that the Army would take a 
unilateral action without waiting unttl noon." General Sung Cheh yuan 
said to both the Nationalist Government and to the nation through radio and 
newspapers，“The 29th Army is making an utmost effort to defend the 
nation, following the order of Nanking. We would like to ask for instruction 
from every circle."" 
- July 29 - Major General lshiwara anticipated that the dispatch of 
troops from Japan would lead to a protracted total war, and hoped for a 
drastic political settlement through diplomatic negotiattons with Nankmg." 
Meanwhile, as the Japanese began to launch an attack, Chiang Kai叶1ek
declared in Kuling that“the Chinese will fight to the finish. H 創 Thus,the 
Chinese Government was preparing to "undertake general hostilities towards 
Japanese troo戸J’butat the same ttme, seemed to be "preserv(mg) as long 
・" as posS1ble any channel through which negotiations might be conducted.’ 
The descnption given above has uncovered several important points which 
resulted m the final decision to dispatch three home divisions and which also 
characterized its process 
First, both Colonel Sh1bayama’s information, which came belatedly, and 
Major General Hashimoto’s request did once fortify Major General 
lshiwara’S position, while Lt Col Wachi’S information worked on the War 
Minister The information about the Langfang and K wanganmen incidents 
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from the Commander of the North China Army undermmed Ishiwara’S 
posltlon, and consequently forced him to decide on the dispatch In such a 
situation, where another game was played ou臼ideJapan, both the players’ 
positions in the central game and the results of 1t tended to be largely affected 
by first-hand information from the spot. 
Second, the For目旦nMinistry received through vanous channels some 
information that Chiang Kai-shek had been prepared to negotiate with Japan. 
For example, British Charge d'Affairs Dodds informed the Vice Foreign 
Minister of Chiang Kai shek’s mtention Also Counc11lor Hidaka in Nanking 
received the ・same kmd of me日agesfrom Kao Tsung wu and Chang Chun." 
Such information would have undoubtedly strengthened both the Foreign 
Mimster’S position and that of the Ministry if Foreign Mmister Hirota had 
used it to persuade other players to go along the lme of the negotiations. But 
there is no evidence to show this efect. The Foreign Minister did not thmk 
it to be his job to work directly on the War Mm1ster and the military. He 
‘＂ tned to have the Naval Minister do this job. Thus, unsat凶edwith his 
stance, Ishii and Kamimura protested against him by handmg in their 
" resi呂nation. Also the Prime Mimster thought that he was unreliable. 
And so did other Cabinet Ministers帥
Third, related to the second point, Prime Minister Konoye did not seem to 
take the initiative to coordinate or lead his Cabinet by himself Since the 
Prime Minister had no organizational or bureaucratic capability of his own 
comparable to that of the Fore唱nMimster in gathering and evaluating 
informauon It might have been one of the possible ways m collaborating 
with the Foreign l羽田町erto strengthen his position. But he only complained 
about the Fa目 ignMm1ster and grumbled that there was no one av剖lablein 
the Cabinet for consultation.刷 Likethe Foreign Minister, Prime Minister 
Konoye did not deal directly with the War Mmister. It was not the Pnme 
Mmister but the Overseas Affairs Minister who asked the War Minister旧
the July 27th Cabinet meeting about the range of the operations It was not 
what was asked but who asked that could have influenced others Thus, he 
failed to have his influence and stance felt in the Cabinet. Consequently, the 
War Minister could not understand what the Pnme Minister had in mind." 
Fourth, the Langfang and the K wanganmen incidents were the 
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orgarnzat旧naloutcomes of the North China Army, which aross under the 
follow in且circumstances.As pointed out, Sung Cheh-yuan’s leadership was 
seriously challenged by Chin Teh-chun and Feng Ch1h an who were 
anti Japanese. Furthermore, the Communist elements maneuvered to have 
both the Ja戸neseand Chinese armies f1且htagainst 阻chother, and the 
anti-Japanese elements disrupted the Japanese Army’S communication lines 
between Peiping and T1entsin. For the Commander of the North China 
Army to dispatch the company to Langfang for repairing the disrupted 
telephone lines was an organizational standard operating procedure, although 
pro-Japanese Chang Tzu Chung feared that it might provoke his army. But it 
was Commander Kazuki’s duty to ensure and protect the communications 
between T1entsin and Peiping After the Langfang incident, the Situation 
became so aggravated that出eSpecial Service Agency deliberately gave the 
Ch回目eonly a short nottce d出ebattalion’s arrival to Peiping in order to 
protect the Japanese nationals there. And there also seemed to exist a third 
party’s maneuver as shown in the negotiations between the Special Service 
Agency and the Chinese o節目白 atK wanganmen. But Major General 
Kazuki’s decision to dispatch a battahon to Peiping was his way as 
Commander of performing his job of protecting the Japanese nationals. As 
Major General Kazuki admitted later, he performed hts duties and reponsi-
bihties only from the standpoint of operations and tactics without a definite 
principle concerning the China problem.御
Fifth, Chiang Kai-shek seemed to acq山田cein the local agreement. At the 
same time, however, "the concentration of forces and supplies in Korea and 
Manchuria”despite the non-expansion policy announced by the Japanese 
Government caused him to suspect that Japan would soon force upon China 
unacceptable demands The Langfang and the K wanganmen incidents and 
the unilateral action of the North Chma Army were presumably viewed in 
thts framework Then the statement of the Japanese Government of July 27 
seemed to undoubtedly compel Chiang Kai-shek to take that firm s回nceat 
Kuling on July 29. 
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IV The Polltics of Peace Moves 
As already pointed out here and there in the preceding chapters, there 
ex1Sted advocates of the early settlement of the issue and of the peace 
negotiations. During the entire period of this study, two games of peace 
moves are identified, although they were not necessanly played independently 
from the other games of non expansion and expansion. One was Prime 
Minister Konoye’s efforts, which was played through his pnvate channels. 
The other was derived from Ma1or General Ishiwara’s efforts, which was, m 
contrast, played in the oficial channels 
Coahtion F剖led
Just after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Prime Minister 
Konoye thought that there was no way but to talk directly with Chiang 
Kai shek "' On July 11 when the statement of the dispatch of troops was 
announced，出eWar Guidance Section of the Army General Staff presented 
to Maior General Ishiwara a proposal that Prime Minister Konoye, or 
Foreign Mm!St町 Hirota,should fly to Nankmg to settle the 1Ssue '" 
Although Ma1or General Ishiwara gave in to the advoじatesof mobilization, 
he tried to put the issue through an informal channel. Thus he advised the 
Prime M1mster to fly to Nankmg to settle the incident."' lwanaga Yukichi, 
the pre51dent of the Domei Press and an intimate of Prime Mmister Konoye, 
advised Konoye to the same efect. " The Prime Minister was willing to 
launch such a diplomatic demarche '" 
In order to sound out the intention of the Chmese Government, Prime 
Mmister Konoye met Naval Minister Yonai on July 16 and tried to have him 
persuade Foreign Minister Hirota to do th!S job.耐 TheNaval Minister did 
not give him a favorable reply, advising him to directly talk to the Foreign 
Minister himself. He doubted the Army's leadership to control itself On 
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July 17, through Harada, Konoye also tried to have Genro Saion1i persuade 
Hirota to accept the task ' On July 18 Kazami invited Ishii of the Foreign 
Ministry, an advocate of peaceful settlement, to the Prime Minister’s official 
reS1dence to hear hIS ideas about peaceful settlement."' The Prime Minister 
sent Kazam1 to the Foreign MmISter to ask him to fly to Nanking. Foreign 
Mmister Hirota was not in favor of the Premier's idea, saymg，“I wonder 1f 
that.would work. ” On the one hand, he thought that such a diplomatic 
damorche would be unsuccessful because the military had no coordmated 
"' policy toward China On the other hand, as a career diplomat he presumably 
believed that diplomatic negotiations were to be performed through the 
formal diplomatic channels and institutions.” 
Despite hIS illness, Prime Mmister Konoye at one time showed such 
eagerness as to have Kazami make preparations for a trip to Nanking. 
Kazam1 set out to arrange a plane, which was however unsuccessful due to 
ほ＂the Army’s interference. In the course of time, the Premi町、田gerness
withered both because of the unfavorable react10ns of the Foreign and Naval 
Mimsters and because of his f回rthat the military leaders could not command 
the whole army Even if the peace talks were successful, the military, 
Konoye and Kazami feared, would not accept the results, which would 
dISgrace both Konoye and Japan. Thus Kazami turned down Ishiwara’s 
lZI 
proposal. 
Yet the Prime Mmister tried to contact the Nationalist Government, usmg 
his private channel On July 24 he sent his p口vateemissary, Miyazaki who 
was, he thought, acceptable to the Chmese Government."' Hsu Shih-ying, 
Chinese Ambassador to Japan, sent a coded telegram about this mISsion to 
the Nanking Government two days before Miyazaki was to leave Kobe. Then 
came Chiang Kai-shek’s telegraphic reply to meet him, which was 
刷
intercepted by the military Miyazaki, who had been closely watched over, 
was arrested on suspicion of esp10nage by a Military Police when he was 
"' about to be board a ship at Kobe The Prime Minister had informed the 
War Mi即日erof this mission, but not well enough The Foreign Mimster 
had not been consulted.目。 Inspite of this failure, Prime MinISter Konoye 
unsuccessfully tned to make similar efforts several times later. 
20日
As described 回rlier, Prime Minister Konoye had such bargaining 
市れ
advantages that no one could compete. He was, as generally admitted, a 
団a
good listener, but never a good persuader nor a coordinator. He never 
tried to de匂themilitary, let alone persuade the War Minister in and out of 
the Cabmet sessions."' Dissatisfied with the Foreign and War Ministers, 
Konoye complained to Harada about them on July 13, saying“The Foreign 
Minister hasn’t reported anythin且， andthe War Mmister is not al 
rehab le.＂＇’ As Konoye’s friend Marquis Kido suggested, Konoye seemed 
to run away from difficulties rather than try to overcome them."' The Naval 
Mmister was unfavorable to his proposal, so was the Foreign Minister But 
Pnme Mmister Konoye did not try to persuade them by himself Instead, he 
had Kazami and Harada do the job. The results might have been different, 
mamly because t is who persuades that often counts. Thus, although there 
were advocates of peace, such as lshiwara and Ishi, he did not even form a 
coahtion between them. What he did in order to contact the Nanking 
Government for peace talks was to send his private emissaries, avoiding 
confltc回 WI出 themilitary and evadmg cumbersome persuasion and 
troublesome bureaucratic procedures through formal diplomatic channels. 
He was not a man who could form a coal山onfor peace overtures with a man 
like Ishiwara Ish1wara was such a man that could say, ＇‘Wm orlose, I don’t 
care about it When I’m worrying about the nation’s destiny, a victory of a 
trivial battle doesn't matter Japan’s defeat in North China doesn't have to 
do with the nation’s destiny .. "" Therefore, without forming a coal山on
for peace in the decision-making system, Prime Mmister Konoye’s efforts 
would not have been successful even if his private emissary had opened a 
channel for direct negotiations with Chiang Kai shek 
Belated Peace Moves 
Despite his approval of the dispatch of the troops, Ma1or General Ishiwara 
adhered to his idea that a protracted total war, which Japan would never be 
able to wm, had to be avoided by al means. He could not facilitate a 
co~sensus in the General Staf, nor could he successfully persuade Pnme 
Mimster Konoye to have peace talks wtth Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, he 
first tried to put the issue on a different channel by contacting the Navy. 
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And, for the issue to be hooked on the oficial channel, the Emperor had to 
be involved in the game. 
] uly 30 Major General Ishiwara visited Vice Admiral Shimada 
Sh1getaro, Vice Chief of the Navy General S阻f,and presented his draft 
proposal for settling the issue. He said that・ 
From the standpoint of operations, an early settlement of the issue is 
necessary. In order to facili阻tea consensus m the Army and to help 
the Government confirm its determination, we have drafted a general 
plan of operations. This has already be四 explainedto the War 
Minister Since the Chief of the Army General Staff desires to have it 
submitted to the Emperor, I would hke to ask your opinion about it.~ ＇ 
In answering the Vice-Admiral’s questions, the Major General said, "Smee 
there is no hope of defeating China, we have no alternative but to seize proper 
opportunities to settle the matter Now is the best occasion since we have 
captured Peiping and T1entsin” The terms for settlement were: (1）‘＇to 
relinquish al the Japanese polittcal rights and interests throughout China, 
which (was) the only way to cultivate the Japan-Chma fnendship and to 
" improve trade between them; (2) Manchukuo must be recognized ’ In the 
•• Il 
afternoon the Navy replied "No objection to submittmg it to the Emperor ” 
Then, MaJor General lshiwara met Captain Fukutome Sh1geru, Chief of 
'" the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff, and expressed his hope.
The best time for peace is now, smce Peiping and T1entsm have been 
captured But the Army General Staff cannot reach an agreement 
The War Mmister seems st!I to be undecisive. I would hke to have 
the Naval Minister persuade him.叩
At 4:00 p.m the Chief of the Army General Staf, Prince Kan'in 
submitted the “Outline of a Plan of Operat10ns m Chma" to the Throne. 
The Emperor asked，“How far are you gomg？＇’“ From the point of 
operations，” replied Prince Kan'm，“we will advance to the line of 
Paoting・”t刷
At 4: 30 pm the Emperor met Pnme Mimster Konoye, who had been 
summoned from a session of the Diet, and said，“If the north-eastern part of 
the Yungtmg River has been subdued, you might as well cease military 
action.'' Prince Konoye replied to the effort that he would strive for settling 
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the matter nght away "' Then the Pnme Minister met individually with the 
War and the Foreign Ministers, informing the War Minister of the 
Emperor’s grave concern about the si回目ion.＇刷
- July 31 In the course of giving a lecture about the plan of operations 
in the Imperial presence, Ma1or General lshiwara explained: 
From the point of operations, we cannot use more than four divisions. 
With this force we can advance叩 lyto the line of Paoting at best, not 
any further. There is a pressing need to seize an opportunity to stop 
the fighting before advancing to that line.'" 
The Emperor agreed with the Major General 
Colonel Shibayama, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War 
Ministry, visited Ishi to ask if there was any way of having the Chinese make 
a cease fire proposal. The Emperor’s words seemed to have affected the 
leaders of the Army in favor of a peaceful settlement. Ishi explained his 
overall proposal for adjusting the Japan China relations, to which Colonel 
Sh1bayama agreed."' 
In the meantime, in Nanking Chiang Kai・shek,Wang Ching-wei and Kao 
Tsung-wu, the head of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 
met with each other Despite his strong-worded statement of July 29, 
Chiang Kai shek hoped to somehow adjust the Japan-China relations. Thus, 
he seemed to have instructed Kao to facilitate Prime Minister Konoye’s 
" determination for peace
August 1 In the afternoon, Ishi, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau 
of the Foreign Ministry, Colonel Sh1bayama, Chief of the Military Affairs 
Section of the War Ministry, and Captain Hoshina, Chief of the M1htary 
Affairs Section of the Naval Ministry, met to discuss Ishi’s proposals for 
cease fire and overall adjustment of the Japan China relations."' Ish1 
explained that, as both governments oficialy announced firm determination, 
1t would not be wise to directly place the matter on the oficial diplomatic 
channels. Therefore, he thought that Funazu Shinichiro, the Chief Director 
of the League of the Japanese Textile Industry in China, who happened to 
stay in Tokyo, would be the right one to deliver the proposals to Kao 
Tsung-wu who hoped for peace and knew Funazu well "' Both Shibayama 
and Hoshina agreed with Ishi, and Shibayama promised to form a consensus 
＂制m the Army along this line. 
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- August 2 -The Prtme Minister, the War, Naval, and Foreign 
Ministers approved of initiating the informal peace overtures咽 Thiswas 
kept secret lest the hardlmers m the Army should interfere with it."' 
- August 3 The proposals drafted by the Asian Affairs Section of the 
Foreign Ministry began to be discussed at the levels of sections and bureaus 
叫n
concerned 
August 4 In the afternoon Vice Forei且nMinister Horiuchi and Vice 
War Minister Lt-General Umezu had a talk about the drafts, and the Vice 
War Minister made some mod1fications. 
In the evenm且CaptainHoshina, Colonel Shibayama, and Kamimura made 
"' the proposals more concrete.
At 9 30 pm Funazu left for Shanghai with the outline of the proposals 
explained by Ishi as no defmite ones were made At the same time a 
telegram was sent to Consul-General Okamoto m Shanghai, informing him of 
Funazu’s mission. The telegram mstructed him to the effort that as the 
meetmg was ex戸ctedto be regarded as Funazu's initiative, the diplomatic 
oficials there should not be concerned with it u’Funazu had sent a telegram 
to Director Tsutsumi of the League of the Japanese Textile Industry in China 
to ask him to go to Nankmg and arrange a meeting with Kao Tsung wu." 
August 5 -The drafts were discussed and amended at the levels of the 
即
V1ce-Min1Sters and the Sections concerned. 
- August 6 In the evening "Overall Adjustment of Sino Japanese 
Relations" was made: 
I Chma shall secretly agree that it will not cal the matter of 
Manchukuo into question hereafter. 
2. An anti Communist pact shall be concluded between Japan and 
China 
3 Chma shall strictly control the anti Japanese and make the Act of 
Frtendsh1p with Japan thoroughly observed 
4. The Shanghai Truce agreement shall be abolished 
5 Free flight of the Japanese planes shall be abolished 
6. Economic and trade cooperation between the two countries shall be 
improved." 
In Shanghai, due to the Chinese army’s reinforcements and due to night 
204 
田aneuvermgsof the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps havin呂 been
intensified since the beginnmg of the month, anxieties and uneasiness had 
been mounting to such an extent Consul-General Okamoto ordered the 
Japanese nationals to evacuate mto the Settlement. Furthermore, al the 
Japanese nationals along the Yangtzekiang River were ordered ot evacuate 
because of the information that the Chmese National Defense Conference had 
decided upon all-out resistance on this day.悶
- August 7 -Before dawn “Sino Japanese Cease Ftre Terms，’ were 
decided upon by the Foreign, War, and Naval Ministers. 
I. All the military agreements such as Tangku Truce, Umezu Ho, 
and Doihara Ching agreements shall be abolished 
2. A certain range of a demilitarized zone shall be set up. 
3. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the East Hopei Anti 
Communist Autonomous Council shall be abolished. The Nanking 
Government shall discretionally administer in these areas. 
4. The force of the Japanese Stationary Army shall be reduced to that 
prior to the incident 
5. When a cease-fire agreement has been reached, Japan and China 
irrespective of the past relations, shall enter into a New Deal to 
ロ刷materialize friendly relations between the two countries 
The “New Deal，’ meant economic aid to China and abolition of extraterrito-
riality, both of which were to be disclosed m the course of negotiations.四
Only a few in the Army and Navy were involved m the formation of these 
proposals in order to avoid oppos山on.Therefore, the Foreign Minister sent 
a telegraphic instruction to Ambassador Kawagoe who returned to Shanghai 
after a month’s absence, statmg that these be kept in strict confidence even to 
the Army and Naval attaches, and that the ambassador be advised not to 
" meet Funazu But Ambassador Kawagoe met Funazu and told him出athe 
himself would take care of the matter." 
In the meantime, Tsutsumi met Kao in Nankmg and mformed him of 
Funazu’s hope. Kao immediately agreed, saying，“I promise to visit Mr. 
Funazu in the evening of the 8th or on the morning of the 9th "" 
August 9 In the morning Kao came to Shanghai and met with 
Funazu Kao said that, although Nanking was dominated by the hardliners, 
Chia•.唱 K副 shek seemed to hope to read1ust relations between the two 
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countries.~· Funazu had rec目ved“SinoJapanese Cease Fire Terms，’ but 
he did not show them to Kao as he conS1dered it to be Ambassador 
Kawagoe’S 1ob Funazu advised him to meet the ambassador."' 
At 6:00 pm Kao visited Ambassador Kawagoe. The Ambassador told 
him that the Japanese Government had decided to take a more generous 
attitude than ever before toward China But it seemed that he failed both to 
present the cease fire terms to Kao and to convey delicate nuance in Tokyo."' 
At about 6:30 p.m. a Naval lieutenant Oyama and a seaman Saito, who 
were unarmed, were killed by the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps on 
Monument Road west of Shanghai也
-Au且ustIO - Because of the m口dentof the previous night, Kao had to 
hurry back to Nanking, saying to Matsumoto,''. I cannot help thinkin呂that
Tokyo should have taken that new attitude, at least, one or two weeks ago. 
Smce the Oyama in口dentoccurred last night, the situation has been getting 
worse. If the Chinese and the Japanese armies clash near Shanghai, 
diplomacy cannot do anything about it・’刈
Thus, frustrated by the Oyama incident, the peace moves did not produce 
any fruitful results However, they not only represented the efforts for peace 
on both Sides, but also reflected typical aspects of the Japan’s decision makmg 
process 
First, the peace moves were one of the most promising events which might 
have led to oficial negotiations through semトoficialchannels. Although, 
faced by advocates of tough measures both in and out of his government, 
Chiang Kai-shek had to officially take a strong stance, he seemed to hope for 
negotiations as Kao Tsung-wu had implied The Japanese decision-makers 
were ready to make a great concession to the Chmese, giving up m。stof the 
rights and interests in North Chma But those who deS1red peace 
negotiations on both sides could not form a coalition mainly because of the 
Oyama incident. In Shanghai, the situation was rapidly getting worse to such 
an extent that the Japanese nationals began to evacuate to the Settlement 
Under such circumstances, things might have been quite different, as Kao 
said, 1£Japan had taken the peace intitiat1ve one or two weeks earlier. But 
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the tardine自国 takmga decision on the part of the Japanese Government, It 
seems, was a typical pattern of its decision-making system, and was 
concerned with the points below 
Second, the way in which Major General lshiwara tried to achieve his 
desired results and to form a consensus in the Army, in particular in the 
General S阻f,represented a typical way of persuaS1on or consensus formation 
in the Japanese decision-makin且system目 MajorGeneral Ishiwara, first of al, 
won the Navy’s favor, and then he had the Emperor informed of h!S plan of 
the operations through the Chief of Staff, Prince Kan 'in. Thus he began the 
Emperor’s initiative. The Emperor called the Pr1me Min1Ster to inform him 
of his hopes, and the Prime Minister mformed the War Mm1Ster of the 
Emperor’s intention Consequently, no one defied the peace moves 
seem in呂lyinitiated by the Empeor. Generally sp四 king,the Emperor seemed 
to fel mhibited from expressing himslef, and he did so only when thmgs 
began to take on a more or les decisive look. In addition, the way in which 
the Emperor got involved was what mi呂htbe called consensus formation 
through indirect persuation (or indirect pers削 sionthrough the intermediary). 
Therefore, it undoubtedly took some time to arrive at a consensus, and thus 
there was a tendency to m1日 opportumties.
Third, in connection with the second point, the Emperor’s initiative 
structured the 伊mein important ways. It made the government leaders 
decide to keep the p田cemoves in strict confidence, which m田町 boththat 
only a limited number of the players were included m the game and that 
active advocate of tough measures were excluded. Furthermore, it seemed 
that some leaders who were not necessarily in favor of the negotiations had 
to, or at least pretended to, accept the mitiative of the Emperor. Thus, the 
War and Vice War Mimsters who represented the War Mimstry accepted 
Ishii’s peace terms only with an addition of several minor modifications m' 
Fourth, in such a delicate situation where oficial channels found it difficult 
to open direct negotiations, it was appropr1ate to have a Civilian’s 
collboration like Funazu’s before entering into offKial negotiations. This 
worked well as far as the central game was concerned. But, despite the 
Foreign Minister’s instruction that no diplomatic of1口alsbe concerned with 
Funazau’s m四阻止 Ambassador Kawagoe took over his job. The 
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Ambassador, it appeared, failed to convey to Kao Tsung wu a nuance which 
the Japanese Government had expected Funazu to Had he showed Kao the 
drastic conce回ionthat the Japanese Government wad prepared to make, the 
results might have been different although such a possibility would have been 
the slightest one due to the occurrence of the Oyama incident. 
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As briefly descnbed m the previous chapter, the situation in Shanghai 
became so aggravating from the beginnmg of August that the Japanese 
nationals evacuated into the Settlement. Just when the Navy was about to 
reinforce its Landing Party of 2,500 vis-a vis the Chinese army of about 
120,000, the Oyama incident occurred on August 9 " But the city 
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author山田ofShanghai did not show any eagerness to settle the incident, nor 
could they四国rolthe Chinese army.''' Thus, the Marco Polo Bndge 
Incident now developed into a new phase from which there was not way out, 
as we shall see below. 
- August 10 Both the Operations Sections of the Navy and Army 
General Staffs, and the M1htary Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy 
Mmistnes had a talk about the preparation for dispatching land troops The 
Army adrmtted that the s1tuat10n required the dispatch, but feared that it 
would inevitably spread the incident The Army, however, could not flatly 
turn down the Navy’s request mainly due to the July 11th agreement 
between the Army and Navy.'" 
In the Cabinet meetmg Naval Minister Yonai requested that preparation 
for the dispatch of land troops be made To this request War Minister 
Sugiyama agreed The Cabmet conf1rmed the policy of protecting the 
nationals m Shanghai, approving the dispatch'" 
After the Cabinet meeting, the War Mmister called Major General 
Nakajima and Major General Ishiwara, Chiefs of the General Affa1rs D1v1sion 
and the Operations Division of the Army General Staff respectively, to 
discuss the dispatch of troops Major General lshiwara insisted that the 
dispatch be rest口ctedto North China, and that the Navy take care of 
Shanghai and Tsing臨0 “IfShanghai is endangered，” he argued, "all the 
Japanese nationals should be repatriated Pay one billion or two bilhon yen or 
whatever for the los and damages. That would be cheaper than a war.＂出
Mamly due to the July 11th agreement between the Navy and Army, 
however, Ma1or General lshiwara could not oppose the dispatch of a 
minimum force to protect the nationals."' 
In the meanu由民 Vice-Admiral Hasegawa, Commander m Chief of the 
Th1rd Fleet, requested from the Chinese that the Peace Preservation Corps be 
immediately withdrawn, and that the military facilities in the dem1htanzed 
area be removed. As the Chinese reinforced the Peace Preservation Corps 
and set up pcsitions around the Settlement, however, the Commander m 
Chief decided to reinforce the Naval force, ordering 1,000 men and some 
battleships near Sasebo to move to Shanghai."' 
- August 11ー Inthe afternoon, the naval reinforcements including 
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seven or eight battleships arrived at Shanghai The sudden appearance of 
these ships undoubtedly had a great impact on the Chinese, especially on the 
hardhners. 8 
August 12 ln the evening. the Commander in Chief of the Third 
fleet re4ue品tedthe dispatch of troops‘reporting the mtirnl situation in 
Shan日hai.剖 Thenby the request of the Navy, the Prime Minister司 theWar, 
N‘1val, and Foreign Ministers met with凶 chother, and Naval Minister 
Yon;11 asked them to send land troops. The other ministers thought that there 
W出 noway but to submit to the request The Emperor also thought 1t 
Il≫ 
difficu It to問 tlethe issue by diplomacy 
Concerning operations in Central China, the Army and Naval General 
Staff：、‘明reedto coop<•rate. From the viewpoint of operations, Major General 
lshiwara seemed to prefer bombing rather than the dispatch of land troops 
But Colonel Muto叩 coura只edthe Navy to co叩eratewith the Army and 
argued that every measure should be taken to "ch出tisethe outrageous 
China‘ ‘日＂
August 13 In the morning the Cabinet conference was convened, 
where the agreement of the previous night was ofi日叫lyapproved. Thus the 
c‘1hinet decided to dispatch two divisions to Shanghai・咽
In Sh山1ghaiAmbassador Kawagoe had been repeated instructed to go to 
N;mkinιbut did not follow the instruction，制ymgthat it would not be 
"' helpful At 4:30 p.m. hostilities opened between the two armi凶， and 
thereafter communications between Sh叩 ghaiand Nankmg were disrupted. ＂＇目
Jn N叩 kin且CounsellorHidaka visited Chinese Foreign Minister Wan斜
Chung-hui to request that the Peace Preservation Corps be withdrawn fro皿
the vicinity of the Settlement and that出emilitary factlites near the Settle-
ment be removed. But the F。reignMu】
effectiveness of the existin且Shan且t】山 ceasefire‘t且reementand so。n叩
- August 14ー TheChinese air forces attacked the flagship of the 
Japanese Third Fleet, the Naval Landing Party, the Consulate, and so on.'" 
Jn the afternooh, the Japanese Navy anr】。ur
h‘now been i。rce《lto take al the necessary and εf，《2口ivemeasures 
Then, the Naval air forces bombed the Chinese air bases in Kengchon‘ 
"' Nanchang, Kuangte, Nankinιetc.
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At 10:00 p.m. an emergency Cabinet meeting was held. War Minister 
Sugiyama unexpectedly pr叩nsedth叫 the只overnmentmake a山山11l'Ot
'" concerning the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. “Now that the sitoation has 
become as such，＂問 idNaval Minister Yonai "the non expansion policv has 
＂’ gone and the North China incident has now changed to the China incident.・ 
But Finance Minister k叩‘IeXf町田町lhis di日atisfoctionin terms of th< 
expenses.四 Andthe Naval Minister condemned him without lettin只him
finish his financial explanation.'" Foreign Minister Hirota w山町淀川 lavor
of the pr叩nsal,bot he did not seem to strongly oppose it. 殴 PrimeMinister 
Konoye kept silent as usual, listening to them patiently. The he approved of 
the War Minister's proposal since no Cabinet Minister巾JCCtedto it o.> 
-Au且ust15ー AtI: Il am. the government announced the statement 
concern in且theMarco Polo Brid貯 Incide町、 whichwas as follows: 
. Now that the Chin田e despise the Empire . and 引nce their 
outrageous actions have endangered the lives and property of our 
nationals throughout China, the Empire has come to the limit of its 
endurance Thus, in order to chastise the b印刷lChinese Army and 
hereby to demand the Nanking Government"s reconsideration、the
Empire has now no alternative but to take a resolute action .. " 
According to Kazami who announced this statement司 Primel羽田ister
Konoye and Kazami himself expected the statement to facilitate local 
settlement, although it implied a pos山vemilitary action." The W‘If 
Minister, who had submitted the pr叩osal,did not expect the incident to 
spread." He stil thought that the "non-expans』on"policy should be 
官加
maintained in order to achieve an early settlement. But it was now 
obvious that the incident chan呂田1its nature because of the hostilities opened 
in Shanghai, the Navy's interests involved, .ind since the decision to dispatch 
troops to Shanghai was taken. 
Consequently, two days later, the Cabinet was to decide on・‘discard(in只）
the existing non-expansion pnlicy, and prepar(in且） al necessary measures for 
the war structure "" 
From the description above, we can identify several pnints which 
chara《terizedthe final phase, and also help in understanding the process in 
which the Au且ustIうthstatement was made. 
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ドtr＇！.、 iththe outl》r《J‘t
at ＇【‘ti《ein Shan只h1』i. One of the Navy's tasl《s¥V出 t《】 protectthe Ja1ヲ‘tn凶c
r】ati《》nalsthere. In山klition,thじ NavalL山i<lingParty of 2,500 was in 
dan陣Jに facedwith the Chinese army of 120,000. To repatriate al the 
Japanese nationals there. 出 MajorGeneral lshiwara argued, meant to 
degrade the Navy s prestige. Therefore. Naval Minister Yanai requested the 
disp川chof land troops aod took a positive stance which he had never taken 
before. 
Second, Naval Minister Yooai could easily influence War Minister 
Sugi、九1mawho thought that the Chinese despised the Imperial Army. In 
出ldition.the Naval Minister’s tough stance encouraged the hardliners in the 
Army. such凶 ColonelMuto and probably Colonel Tanaka, and others, who 
in turn undoubt目lyinfluenced the War Minister to such叩 extentthat he 
himself took the旧日iativein announcing the Au』iust15th statement 
Third. the Army did not turn down the Navy's request of the dispatch, 
and even Major General lshiwara who was not in favor of it could not reject it 
mainly because of the July 11th agreement between Army and Navy. To 
dispatch the land troops to Shan且h山.however. did not contra《Jictthe Army's 
interests, but mher promoted them Therefore司 therewas no reason for the 
Army to oppose the Navy’s request althou且hthe dispatch, the Army 
thought, would spread the incident Thus, an alliance was formed between 
Navy 叩 dArmy, and both General Staffs a且reedto cooperate in the 
operations in Central China. 
Fourth. Vice Admiral Hase且awareinforced the Naval force in Shanghai by 
sen di町；thebattleships there, which constituted governmental action. As the 
Commander 1n Chief of the Thtrd Fleet, he had to protect the Japanese 
natiooals and to aid the Naval Landing Party. The sudden appearance of the 
battl白川psin Shanghai, which was an outcome of the existing organizational 
procedures of the Navy, undoubtedly caused the Chinese air forces to attack 
the flagship and other Japanese facilities. Thus, the reinforcements of the 
Japanese Navy tn Shan呂haitri呂且eredthe organizational procedures of both 
Japanese and Chinese forces. 
Fifth, the Japanese Navy’s action seemed to have confirmed the Chinese 
belief that Japan had by far greater objectives than the Marco Polo Bridge 
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Incident Thus, as Kao Tsung-wu once said、any<liplomauc efforts woold 
have been futile at this stage even if Ambassador Kawagoe had succ℃日fuly
contacted the Nanking Government following the instruction of the Foreign 
Minister. 
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Conclusions 
Since the charactenstics of each phase or game have been pointed out in 
the last part of each section, we shall not repeat them here ’Instead, we shall 
concern ourselves both with what characterized the entire period from July 7 
throu呂hAugust lうandwith what seemed to represent some general patterns 
of the Japanese decision-making behavior drawn from the present study. 
First, there existed the shared images among the players which 
si呂nificantlyconstrained them to behave within these images. They were a 
set of superiority complex over China and the Chinese, comprising (1) Chma 
was weak and inferior, (2) Japan was strong and superior, thus (3) if Japan 
took a positive stance, China would succumb, therefore (4) if (3) failed, it 
meant that China despised Japan without knowmg her capability, 
consequently (5) China should be chastised and called for self-reflection. 
These images were shared by most of both military and civilian players, 
"' especially by the hardliners These images were not derived from any 
rational estimates of the situation, but they were psychological and/or 
emotional phenomena. Major General Ishiwara and his War Guidance 
Section argued based upon the rational calculation and estimates of the 
situation that Japan would mev1tably呂田bogged down mto a protracted total 
war with China. But they could not persuade others because their argument 
was devient from the shared images and because they failed to form a 
coalitwn with o由erlike-mmded players, which could have chan呂d the 
shared images 
Second, the serious lack of leadership both in the Cabinet and m the Army 
division particularly during this period should be pomted out The Army 
General Staff was almost paralyzed because of the lack of effective leadership. 
The Chief of the Staff, Prince Kan’m was not expected to effectively 
command the General Staf. Because he was an Imperial prince, and m 
addition was very old, every member of the General Staff seemed to keep his 
distance from him閣 Thus,the Vice Chief of the Staff, Lt-General Imai was 
to actually command and coordmate the General Staff, but, because of his 
216 
"' serious ilnes, everyone hesitated to consult him. Therefore, the actual 
responsibility to manage the General Staff fel on Major General Ishiwara, 
'" Chief of the Operations DlVlsion. An able man as he was, he could not 
persuade other diviS1on chiefs partly because he was an outsider and partly 
because he had deprived them of their divisional influence by reforming the 
General Staf.問 Thus,without the leverage of the Chief and the Vice-Chief of 
Staf, Major General lshiwara could not successfully lead the General Staff 
Although the Prime Minister’s leadership was mstitu tlonally restricted, 
the lack of Prime Mimster Konoye’s leadership was particularly due to 
personal factors Despite his uncomparable advantages, he failed to have hlS 
influence and intention felt directly or indirectly in the Cabinet. There is no 
evidence that he himself took the initiative in the Cabinet conferences. He 
'" usually had someone else speak on hlS behalf Of course, it was institution 
aly difficult for any Pnme Minister to be in good terms with the War 
"' Minister and thereby to coordinate the Cabinet, but Prime Mimster Konoye 
did not try to work on the War Minister to improve their awkward relations.附
He did not try to put the Foreign Minister under his control, nor did he 
facilitate cooperative relations between them Furthermore, he was not a 
man of responsibility and decision as a leader When he was later pressed by 
Major General Ishiwara for a decision to withdraw the Japanese army from 
China and thereby to settle the incident, he said，‘＇. I fel responsible for the 
China Incident as Pnme Minister, but I cannot刑akeS町 ba m叩ordecision 
•• l9l 
as lshiwara has requested me to do." 
Third, it can be generally be said that those who argue confidently win the 
game. This assumption seems to have held true as far as such junior players 
as Colonels Muto, Tanaka and others who were actually in charge of drafting 
operations plans, gathering information, and forming a military budget were 
'" concerned Just because of their particular p。sitionsof being in charge of 
making plans and of implementing poli旧民 theycould affect War Minister 
Sugiyama and Ma1or General Ish1wara. 
But the way in which players at higher levels釘iedto persuade others in 
order to get their desired results represented one of the typical and dominant 
patterns of the Japanese decision-making behav10r, to which the above 
assumption did not necessanly apply. As exempli白edby lshiwara’s peace 
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moves in chapter. N, what we called conse制 Sformation through indt問 d
pe悶印刷（orindirect persuasion through the intermedtaワ＇） seems to have 
been the dominant pattern This may have been closely related to the lack of 
leadership in the decision-makin~ system particularly during this period as 
desc口bedabove. The senior decision-makers, it seems, did not try to directly 
persuade those whom they wanted to. Instead, Prime Mmister Konoye and 
Foreign Mimster Hirota, for example, tried to indirectly work on War 
Mimster Sugiyama through Naval Mimster Yonai. The Prime Mmister 
also had other Cabmet Mmisters do his job as m the case of the July 20th 
Cabmet session Even Naval Minister Yonat tried to prevent the War 
"' Mmister from being overridden by hardliners through the Foreign Minister
We know that Major General lshiwara and the Milt阻ryAffa田 Bureauof the 
War Mm1stry tried to throw out the War Mmister’s mobilization proposal of 
July 11, using the leverage of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Mmistry 
. "' respectively
These examples suggest that indi，四ctpersuation through the intermedtaりF
tended to be used either when persuaders hesitated to directly persuade others 
or when persuatton failed. The success of indirect persuasion through the 
mtermediary presumably depended upon the condition that the mtermediary 
who was to act as a persuader on behalf of the origianal persuader had to be 
superior to, and more influential than the persuadee. Therefore, when the 
intermediary at a certain level failed to persuade, successful persuasion might 
have been possible by turning to another intermediary at a higher level. 
Thus, how to get the Emperor involved in the game would have been one of 
the maior factors for success, although he was customa口ilysupposed to not 
刊。
get involved This probably explams the contrast between Konoye’s and 
!sh1wara’s peace moves. 日S
Fourth, especially when the incident occurred and developed far away from 
home, it was extremely difficult for the central decision-makers to have 
accura田 andcurrent informatton which represented each development of the 
incident. Thus, each time first-hand mformation was brought about, t 
naturally affected each player’s position and thereby turned the balance of the 
games. This trend was reinforced partly because senior decision-makers 
lacked l白 dershtpand had no speci自cplan to cope with the mc1dent. 
218 
Furthermore, when the decision resulted from each complicated game, it was 
then inappropriate for the new s1tuat1on As we have seen, this had 
characterized the entire period of the North China Jnci《lent.
Fifth，呂enerallyspeaking, it is usually very difficult or almost impossible in 
some cases for the central decision makers to be able to oversee the army 
stauoned far away from home. For one factor, the estimates of the s1tuatIOn 
by central demion makers are often different from those by the field army 
directly facing the situation For another, the decision or instrucuon often 
allows the implementer to act m his own way Jn addition to these, such 
circumstances as referred to in the fourth characteristic, gave by far且reater
leeway to the North China Army to act on its own mitiauve To fix the 
deadline on July 19 for the implementation of the July 11th agreement by the 
Hope1-Chahar Poliucal Council was initiated by the Commander of the North 
・no 
China Army, although it was about to be implement. And the deadline of 
July 19 was decided upon according to the organizational procedure of the 
North China Army, i e,the plan that strategic deployment of the army was 
叫相
to be complete by that date. On July 19 the North China Army 
announced that 1t would take a unilateral acuon starting on July 20. 
Commander Kazuki decided to dispatch one company to Langfang on July 
25, and one battalion to P日pmgon July 26 He also decided to forward the 
"' ultimatum to the Chinese on July 26. All these were the decisions and 
actions taken by the Commander of the North China Army to cope with the 
changing situations. And, needless to say, such actions also constituted 
governmental actions of Japan. 
Sixth, various actions of the Japanese Government in the form of 
statemen白 andmilitary actions affected the Chinese to a si呂町ificantextent. 
Above al, military acuons according to the respective or且anizauonal
procedure, such as the appearanc田 ofthe Kwan tung Army in Pei pin呂on
July 13, and the Korea Army in T1entsm by July 14, and of the battleships 
of the Third Fleet in Shanghai, together with “the concentrauon of forces 
and supph田 inKorea and Manchuria”did confirm the』mageheld by the 
Chinese that the Japanese Government had major objectives and would soon 
force China into unacceptable demands.＇’ Thus, these actions seem to have 
undermined other actions of the Japanese Government in the form of the 
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non-expansion policy and vanous diplomatic efforts, which otherwise might 
have changed the Chinese image of Japan. 
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北支事変一官僚政治モデルを通して（皿）
〈要約〉
井上真蔵
本研究で取りあつかった全過程を特徴づけた要因には次のようなもの
カずあった。
第lに，プレーヤー聞に共通したイメージがあり，プレーヤーはかな
りこのイメージにとらわれて行動していた。そのイメージは中固と中国
人とに対する優越感の集合であり，特に強硬派の聞には顕著にみられた。
第2に内閣および軍部に沿ける指導力の欠如が指摘される。特に軍部
における指導力の欠知は，参謀本部の機能を麻痔させかねないほどのも
のであった。内閣における指導力欠如は，たしかに制度的な時I］約もあっ
たが，近衛首相の場合は，ことにその性格に起因していた。
第3に，一般的に確信を持って論ずるものが，ゲームで勝ちを制して
いる。このことは特に，実際に作戦計画を練り，情報を収集し，軍事予
算を作成するジュニヤ・プレーヤーの場合に適合するように思える。
第4に，情報，ことに事態の進展を告げる確実な情報が，中央の政策
決定者に伝わりにくく，そのため，リーダーシップ欠如とあいまって，
決定がなされた時にはすでに新しい事態に適合しえない，ということに
なったのである。この点が全過程を通じて大き＇：.影響を及lました。
第5に海外派兵の際には一般的にも，これを管理，統制することが困
難である。加えて，支那派遣軍の場合は，独自の判断で行動すべき余地
を与えられていた。しかも，派遣軍独自の判断も日本政府の行動の一部
をなしていたのである。
第6に，声明，軍事行動などの日本政府の行動が，中国側にかなり影響
を及ぼした。なかんづく， 2,3の軍事行動は，中国側の対日観に大きな影響
を及ぼし，不拡大政策や外交努力を水泡に帰せしめた。 （森山昭郎訳）
